Abstract. Entry restrictions are a common form of regulation in markets and occupations, either as a means of limiting the size of a market or affecting the quality of products or services provided by it. This paper analyzes demand, cost and informational characteristics that affect the impact of this type of policies on the quality mix of products provided by an industry and the welfare of its consumers. Selective increases in the costs of entry such as licensing requirements and direct restrictions with competitive bidding for entry rights are considered. We analyze the effects of these policies on entry decisions and also the additional selection effects that are obtained when exit is allowed for and the rights to participate in an industry can be freely traded.
Introduction
Entry restrictions are a common form of regulation in markets and occupations, either as a means of limiting the size of a market or affecting the quality of products or services provided by it. Such policies are usually implemented through licensing requirements or via direct controls on the number of firms operating in an industry together with a mechanism to allocate the rights to participate in it. The former are most common among some professions and occupations, while the latter have been widely used, for instance, in markets for transportaHugo Hopenhayn acknowledges partial support of NSF grant SES-8911789 and Walter Garcia-Fontes acknowledges support of DGICYT grant PB95-0980. We thank the comments of Maria Eugenia Moniagurria and two anonymous referees, but remaining errors are our own responsibility. tion services 1 . This paper provides a very tractable model to study the demand, cost and informational characteristics that affect the impact of these two types of policies on the quality mix of products provided by an industry and on the welfare of its consumers.
The imposition of minimum quality standards is studied by Leland (1979) , who tried to identify conditions under which a market would benefit from the imposition of direct quality controls. Shapiro (1986) departs from Leland's model by considering indirect controls on the quality level through licensing requirements. In his model entrants are required a minimum standard of investment in order to obtain the licenses. When this minimum standard is only binding for low quality entrants -as in the main case studied by Shapiro -licensing requirements play the role of a selective increase in the cost of entry of low quality producers. This is the first type of policy we consider. Alternatively, direct controls on the number of firms operating in a market with competitive bidding for the rights to participate in it increase symmetrically the costs of all firms. This is the second type of policy we consider.
Our analysis is closer to Shapiro's, but we analyze the problem of adverse selection while he concentrates in moral hazard problems. As in this previous literature, we analyze free-entry equilibria, since licensing and entry restrictions are usually present in professional services and other services industries, that is industries that are fairly competitive. The basic model we consider extends the previous literature on licensing as follows: i) The size of the market is determined endogenously ii) We consider a Bayesian learning structure where consumers cannot screen perfectly between low and high quality firms. As in Akerlof (1970), a high ratio of low quality products is obtained and entry restrictions may have perverse results. Since the market cannot distinguish between high and low quality firms, the latter can free ride in a common pool of unknown firms crowding out high quality firms. We study the effects of entry restrictions on the quality mix of firms.
In contrast to the case of licensing considered above, rights are often tradeable in markets where the total number of firms is regulated 2 . The value of these rights has not only an effect on entry decisions but also represents an opportunity cost that may affect exit 3 . Since those firms that have revealed to be low quality are more likely to exit, this selection process could lead to an increase in quality over time. The higher the value of these rights is, the more intense this selection effect may be. By increasing the value of these rights, entry restrictive policies
